28
August 2013 –
I Repeat:
Stay Out of the Fight In Syria!
Why does President Obama insist on focusing
his foreign policy on the predictable atrocity of Syria? Nothing in
Syria—including the government’s use of poison gas on its enemies—threatens any
U.S. strategic interests in the region. Israel
continues to defend itself. Turkey still
controls its borders and its sovereignty.
Oil still flows from Syria’s neighbors to the south and east. Russia is still our opponent. Iran still hates us and will continue to
influence Shi’ites in the region to support its stance to destroy Israel. Therefore, the President’s use of the
military instrument of national power in Syria is the wrong action at the wrong
place and the wrong time. Consider the following facts.
Syria’s is a civil war. On one side, the oppressive Assad government
hates the United States and aligns itself with our international opponents,
like Iran and Russia. On the other side,
most of the rebel groups also hate the United States; if these rebels are not
the brothers of our violent, Islamist enemies, they are at least their first
cousins. This truly is not our
fight.
The time-proven adage for entering another’s
civil war is simple: Pick a side and
then do what it takes to win decisively.
Making a point or militarily punishing the Assad regime for its actions,
even to the destruction of all remaining chemical weapons, will make no friends
among the combatants nor among any of their outside supporters. Even more important, it will show us to be
naïve and weak. There may be others who
may want our help to resolve their problems, but are now afraid of what they
would have to endure to get that help. Let’s
stay out of others’ civil wars unless we are prepared to win.
To destroy the remaining chemical weapons—even
if we could do it with drone and missile attacks—will not satisfy the combatants,
their supporters, or even those who demand that the U.S. be the world’s
policeman. U.S. military attacks in
Syria will change nothing on the ground there.
The combatants will continue to fight.
Our opponents in the region will continue to support their chosen
combatants and continue to condemn us in world fora for their own
purposes. Even worse, after such a
failure, the President will be strongly tempted to expand the initial objective
of punishing the Assad regime. The
President will feel pressure to “do something more” or be thought of as weak,
domestically and internationally. Is such pressure powerful on a president? Our gradualism without a strategy in Vietnam,
our war of opportunity against the wrong enemy at the wrong time in Kosovo, our
misreading of the fractured society in Iraq after the initial victory, and even
our decision to nation build in Afghanistan after our quick success in
destroying terrorist enclaves should tell us that indeed, “doing something
more” is a powerful temptation.
If the President succumbs to attacking Syria
in the near future, he owes the American people a public justification for his
present and future actions. He should identify
the compelling U.S. interests for military action, lay out a solid strategy to
satisfy that interest, and commit to major operational plans to accomplish the
strategy. The U.S. military knows how to
clarify a strategy, build the operational plan, and execute it as well as any
military force in the history of civilization.
What the U.S. military can’t create, but must have so it can adapt the
strategy and operational plans to overcome fog of war, is a clear, compelling
reason to commit violence. Nothing the
President has said to date identifies this compelling interest. A war is at our door with nothing to fight
for.
The President has plenty of time to work
something out since he foolishly laid down the red line of chemical weapons use. President Assad and his advisors realized that
President Obama couldn’t make a good case for U.S. intervention; when the
situation demanded it, they used chemical weapons. President Assad deliberately stepped over the
red line. He called President Obama’s
bluff. President Obama doesn’t have winning
cards in this hand; but, that doesn’t mean he won’t lose this hand and then
play another, and another, and another, to try to recoup his losses. Professional card players like to play
against guys like that. They are called
losers.