31 January 2014 –
Still
looking for George Washington
After
a 30-year career in the Air Force, I found myself in 2009 working for the State
Department in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I monitored
U.S.-funded military training contracts in one of the most dysfunctional
countries on earth. My fellow contractors and I tried to teach
Congolese soldiers to stop being thugs, rapists, and murderers and to become
professional soldiers. Our ambitious goal was to build a foundation
upon which the Congolese people could build a cohesive nation.
Most
of the soldiers were unpaid, former rebels more loyal to their tribes than to
the government in the faraway capital of Kinshasa. They had
guns and would routinely take food from stores without paying. They
also stopped cars on the road to shake down the drivers for
money. We were stopped this way many times. The officers
were barely literate and stole their soldiers’ pay. They also
compelled their soldiers to force Congolese villagers to dig for gold and
diamonds. Because everybody in the DR Congo is hungry, we could get
soldiers to show up for training by feeding them lunch. Pretty basic
stuff.
We
contractors couldn’t solve the fundamental social and political problems that
resulted in the deaths of more than five million people in the Congo between
1998 and 2005. Nor could we stop the disease and violence, which
still prevails. But the training contracts continued because U.S.
strategy was to keep a light presence in the Congo and to stay involved until
such time as the situation may allow decisive U.S. action. It was a pragmatic
and sensible strategy that cost little money, no lives, and produced little
adverse publicity. I agreed wholeheartedly with it.
In
late 2011, I developed and taught a course to help professionalize senior
Congolese officers. Until then, our courses had focused on lower
ranks. In this fifty-hour course, I showed senior Congolese officers
how to lead military forces in such a way that Congolese people could rally
around them for support and protection. This would help change the
military from being part of the problem to becoming part of the solution in a
country full of insurgents.
It
became apparent to me that even a simple strategy such as ours in the DR Congo
succeeds only when those on the ground—soldiers, contractors, or foreign
service officers—approach their tactical mission with
professionalism. The best we as tactical applicators of the State
Department’s overall strategy could realistically hope for was to influence one
Congolese soldier at a time. On the strategic level, we succeeded
just by being there. On the tactical level, we nonetheless did a
professional job because we couldn’t do anything less. My course
attempted to achieve something grand, even when the strategy didn’t demand
something so ambitious.
One
of the basic tenets of the course that the tradition set over two hundred years
ago by military leaders such as George Washington is a good model for how
professional, apolitical foundations for a new nation are built. I
told the corrupt colonels and generals that I was looking for a Congolese
George Washington who would rise above regional disputes and violent reprisals
and be a man around whom a cohesive Congo could grow. I indeed searched
for a Congolese George Washington, knowing how unlikely it was to find
one. I still hope that one of these military students will remember
his mission and one day will have the courage to stand up when the moment is
right.
Our
nation’s leaders must understand the basic lessons of the DR
Congo. When our leaders craft strategies on the international scene,
using the instruments of national power to accomplish them, they must exhibit
the same courage, commitment, and willingness to sacrifice that their soldiers,
foreign service officers, and contractors show when they implement the
strategies. The President and in his associates have exhibited few
of these virtues. They seem to float from one international calamity
to another, resolve nothing, and leave messes for others to clean
up. Despite their abuse of the process, our so-called leaders continue
to have – without deserving it -- the loyalty of virtuous Americans who bravely
execute their shallow plans. In reality, these leaders are no more
worthy to be called George Washington’s successors than are the corrupt
officers in the pest holes of the world.
No
one will think of them when they are gone.