25 June 2013 - What About Syria?

25 June 2013 –

What About Syria?  A nineteenth-century power-politician’s statement might apply there today: 

“The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” – Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck - 1880s

The President is not following one of the fundamental rules of foreign affairs: Never enter into another’s conflict unless your strategic interests are being threatened.  The U.S. cannot gain strategically and will only face additional problems, by arming Syrian rebel groups.  A wiser method of planning and decision-making follows what Robert D. Kaplan wrote in Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos: “I focus on the dark side of every development not because the future will necessarily be bad, but because that is what foreign policy crises have always been about.” 

The dark side: 

If Bashar al-Assad remains in power or if a leader of a particular rebel group emerges from the smoke, it doesn’t significantly affect U.S. strategic interests or those of the region’s other major power players: Iran, Russia, Turkey, or Israel.   

Most Syrian rebel groups have radical Sunni religious and political origins; they want to overthrow the regime controlled by Assad’s minority Shia Alawite sect.  Syria’s civil war is as religious as it is political.  Increased U.S. support for any side wins us no friends, but embroils us in a war controlled by enemies.  This is a bad strategy for a superpower.    

Assad’s major foreign supporters are Iran and Russia.  Iran uses Syria to extend Iranian and Shia power in the region, specifically at the expense of Christians and Sunni Muslims in Syria and Lebanon.  If Sunni rebel groups take over the Syrian government, Iran’s power will be diminished; but, Iran will pursue its strategic interests through increased violence against Christians and Sunni Moslems in the area.   The current Syrian civil war is only the latest round in Islam’s centuries-old Sunni-Shia conflict.  A rebel victory will change very little for outside players like the United States.      

Russia is another outside player.  Its strategic interests in the region haven’t changed since the time of the tsars: naval access to the Mediterranean and allies to the south of Turkey.  The Russian navy has long maintained a repair and resupply facility at the port of Tartus, Syria.  Use of this port enables the Russian navy to sustain forces in the Mediterranean without them having to return through the Turkish-controlled Dardanelle Straits to the Black Sea.  Syria, therefore, is strategically important to Russia, no matter who sits in Damascus.  It is easier for Russia to support Assad than it is to renegotiate with a new government for the use of the Tartus naval facility.  And, a Sunni-controlled Syria would be less inclined to act as a southern counter-weight to a Sunni-dominated Turkey.  Iran and Russia’s strategic interests in the region, therefore, are best-served by keeping Assad in power. 

Turkey’s position on the civil war is a complex one.  Its present government, a Sunni religious resurgence movement under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, would benefit somewhat from a Sunni rebel victory.  But, other influences play heavily as well.  There is a small, but vocal, Shia Alawite minority in southern Turkey who would cause political problems for Erdogan if Assad were to fall.  The refugees now fleeing Northern Syria into Turkey are mostly Sunni Moslems pushed out by Alawite government forces.  They would change to Shia Alawites seeking refuge with their religious compatriots in Southern Turkey if the rebels were to win.   

A rebel victory would force Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan to establish ties with an Arab Syria under new government.  But, the Arab world still regards Turks as Ottomans salivating for a new empire.  A Sunni-controlled, Arab Syria may prove to be as difficult a neighbor to Turkey as the present Shia-controlled, Arab Syria.  It is in Turkey’s strategic interests to contain, not expand, the civil war to the south.  Sending U.S. arms to the rebels will expand the war and damage relations with a critical NATO ally. 

Israel’s strategic concern is simple:  No matter who wins Syria’s civil war, U.S.-provided arms will eventually show up on both sides of the Israeli/Syrian border, in the hands of those who want to kill Israelis.  Israel constantly faces a truth that our president seems to ignore:  Military arms are fungible and usually outlive the current conflict.  The U.S. threatens Israel’s security by giving arms to the Syrian rebels.   

No matter who wins Syria’s civil war, the players in the region will continue to pursue their own interests.  Giving arms to the rebels is simply not in the U.S.’s strategic interests because it damages our relations with our allies and gives murderous options to our adversaries.